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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to propose an alternative behavioural
definition of computation (and of a computer) based simply on
whether a system is capable of reacting to the environment—the
input—as reflected in a measure of programmability. This definition
is intended to have relevance beyond the realm of digital computers,
particularly vis-a`-vis natural systems. This will be done by using
an extension of a phase transition coefficient previously defined
in an attempt to characterise the dynamical behaviour of cellular
automata and other systems. The transition coefficient measures
the sensitivity of a system to external stimuli, and will be used to
define the susceptibility of a system to being (efficiently) programmed.
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1 The question of computation and comput-
ing
Despite attempts to formulate one spanning several decades, no agreed-upon
definition of computation exists to this day [19, 7, 28, 35, 36, 37, 23]. Le-
gitimate objections have been raised, for instance, to representationalist and
functionalist definitions [19, 32, 13, 23, 24]. No existing account of computa-
tion seems free of the following requirements: that the system’s specification
be known, that a model representation or mappings among states or functions
be available. Which makes it difficult to characterise natural computation
(some accounts simply decree that natural computation constitutes compu-
tation as such). Here we advance what to our knowledge is a novel approach
based on the behaviour of a system, very much in the spirit of Turing’s re-
sponse when asked about the applicability of the notion of intelligence to
entities other than humans or animals, in particular to computing machines.
Formal thought about computation begins with machines and then proceeds
to consider natural processes (such as brains and physical phenomena), which
runs contrary to the direction of history, since the original ‘computers’, the
entities engaged in computation when Turing began thinking about elec-
tronic computers, were actually human beings. Perhaps this paradox has to
do with the centrality of the digital in today’s understanding of computation,
as against a possibly more general notion of computation covering other than
digital.
The most important notion of computation has been the notion of dig-
ital computation, and the most important feature of digital computation is
universality. Turing’s abstract idea of a universal computer turned out to
be technologically feasible, showing that though physics may not compute,
it at least supports computation, as we have built devices whose behaviour,
despite being governed by the laws of physics, effectively implements general-
purpose digital computation. Even though other forms of computation may
exist or have been advanced—quantum computation, for instance—they are
measured against the digital model, and no consensus exists as regards the
notion of universality except with reference to digital computation (analogue
computation, for example, has no standard definition of universality. Thus
since Turing, the concept of computation has for the most part been couched
in the form of the concept of digital mechanical computation. The semi-
nal concept of computational universality can clearly be associated with the
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amenability of a machine to being (re)programmed, with the existence of a
general-purpose machine that can emulate any other machine of the same
class and is hence deeply related to the notion of programmability. In this
paper we place the concept of programmability at the centre of the discus-
sion, with a view to extending the notion of computing to unconventional and
natural computation. Programmability here is invoked in a slightly different
manner than its standard usage (e.g., a specific–purpose TM is programmable
on the present account).
The study of the limits of computation has succeeded in generating insight
into what computation might be. The borderline between the decidable
and the undecidable has provided an essential intuition in our search for a
better understanding of computation. One can, however, wonder just how
much can be expected from such an approach, and whether other, alternative
approaches to understanding computation may complement the knowledge
and intuition it affords, especially vis-a-vis modern uses of the concept of
computation in the context of nature and physics, corresponding to situations
in which objects or events are seen as computers or computations.
One such approach involves not the study of systems lying “beyond” the
uncomputable limit (also called the Turing limit), but rather the study of
the minimum requirements for reaching universal computation, through a
focus on the ‘smallest’ possible systems capable of universal computation—
how easy or complicated it is to build a universal Turing machine, and
how efficient such a machine is. This minimalistic bottom-up approach is
epitomised by Wolfram’s programme [51] together with its interesting older
[44, 46, 39, 48] and more recent incarnations [51, 6, 34, 25, 45, 2]. Put-
nam [19] and Searle have advanced strong objections based on the argument
that an overly broad notion of computation leads to trivialisation, where
for example, every system realises every Turing-computable function (strong
pancomputationalism), and where arbitrary state mappings and encodings
yield meaningless definitions of computation.
One can think of formal semantics as an approach to defining compu-
tation through programming languages and models of computation, which
makes a distinction between syntax and semantics, mapping programs onto
mathematical objects describing the relationship between the syntax and
the model of computation (thus being model dependent). According to the
semantics approach, a computation is a function that maps input onto out-
put [31]. Syntax defines the correct form for valid programs and semantics
determines what (if anything) they compute. In other words:
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Computation = PL Syntax + PL Semantics
With PL meaning programming language. There are several widely used
techniques (e.g. algebraic, axiomatic, denotational, operational, and transla-
tional) for the description of the semantics of programming languages, all of
which deal with their behaviour. The distinction is often made between syn-
tax, concerned with what constitutes a program, and semantics, concerned
with the question of what a program computes, or what an expression means
and whether or not two expressions are equivalent.
In most accounts of computational processes as realised by physical mech-
anisms, it is also often assumed that there is a one-to-one correspondence
between causal physical states and the states of a computation defined
by some abstract model in which these states can be represented. Put-
nam [19] and Scheutz [30] discuss the issue of the correspondence of ab-
stract/computational state to physical state.
The traditional mapping-states definition of physical computation is prob-
ably inspired by formal semantics, in that it requires that a mapping be es-
tablished between a model and a physical system, meaning that states and
events in the model are used to label states and events observed in the system
treated as mathematical objects. For example, if φ is a Turing universal com-
puting machine, for any other computational process ω, there is an effective
mappingM such that any input x for ω can be encoded as an inputM(x) for
φ, so that after φ has performed its computation, φ(M(x)) can be decoded
to the answer that ω would have given for x, that isM−1(φ(M(x))) = ω(x)
if ω halts.
However, one can rarely find or justify such mappings M in natural sys-
tems (independently of whether they exist), models of natural systems are
often not easily amenable to formal analysis and simulation at different scales.
In general it is arbitrary to, for example, map a “natural state” to a halting
state for the standard definition of digital computation to apply, nor can
we always know what path nature has taken to produce a given outcome,
regardless of whether or not we see this path as constituting a computation
(and even independently of whether there is a causal connection).
The syntactic approach to defining computation is closely related to the
common (and often informal) view that computation is information process-
ing, which in turn is related to what I think is an informal gesture toward
“programmability”. The direct connection between computation and infor-
mation processing is not trivial at all and Floridi has advocated to make a
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clear distinction between two variations of information of semantic content
[14] where the observer plays an important role. Floridi’s account of one
of two types of information [15], that is instructional information, may be
related to what this approach is proposing regarding the existence of ”an
interpreter that transforms what is in a system into a set of instructions to
be executed by a computer, showing that the system can be said to com-
pute. The importance of this comment stems from the role that propaga-
tion/processing of information plays in the present account.
From the point of view of this behavioural approach to computation, the
syntactic approach falls short of achieving its own objective, viz. distinguish-
ing what computation is from what it is not, because it is not at all clear how
one can or cannot find a mapping between the states of any given (even nat-
ural or physical) system and a computational one in the broad contexts we
are interested in. The semantic approach, however, appears to accommodate
some common intuitions about what does and does not count as a computing
system, but it requires that relations be established between computational
states. For example, it can be made to work by introducing the notion of
an interpreter. If an interpreter exists to transform what is in a system into
a set of instructions to be executed by a computer, then the system can be
said to compute. This, however, is not an easy task when it comes to making
such mappings between natural and state-oriented computing systems.
David Deutsch [11], has defended the position that computers are physi-
cal objects, and computations are physical processes governed by the laws of
physics. However, the theory of computation has traditionally been studied
almost entirely in the abstract, as a topic in pure mathematics. If computers
are closer to physical and natural processes one may expect to face some
of the same challenges in the approach to defining computation for abstract
systems than for natural systems. Turner [47], for example, points out De
Millo’s “argument from complexity” [43]. That is, “that the complexity of
many contemporary computational systems irrespective of their ontological
nature, demands that they be treated as physical systems”, because there is
no practical approach to verifying the correctness of a sophisticated computer
program (for example, an air traffic controller) without treating it as a “nat-
ural system”, that is performing experiments and observing their outcomes
(and this is in practice one of the pillars of software verification in techniques
such as randomized testing), and not as a “mathematical system” for which
one can verify its correctness without having to run the program (very much
along the lines of Wolfram’s Principle of Computational Equivalence [51] that
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seems to synthesise and generalise this position).
We advance here a metric of behaviour of computation along these lines,
distinguishing objects to which some degree of computation can be assigned
according to how they behave, particularly how they can be programmed,
hence placing programmability at the centre of the discussion and definition
of computation. Clearly, by such a definition one may now not call some-
thing a computer if for any input it leaves it unchanged, or if for any input
the same output is always produced, which is what we take as the contrary
of the action of “being programmed”. Between these two cases, however, we
think there is room for a behavioural definition. Thus a system will be a
computer depending on its capabilities to react to external stimuli related
to the notion of “programmability”. The usual feeling with things such as
calculators is that one does not program a calculator because it is a “specific-
purpose computer” but still a calculator is highly sensitive to external stimuli
and depends completely on the input (numbers and operations) to determine
the output, hence it is in this sense highly programmable. In our context,
programmable does not mean therefore to rewire a system but to make it be-
have in a desired way (e.g. adding or multiplying given numbers). We think
this is the spirit behind the concept of universality, that is, that hardware or
software rewiring is at some fundamental level equivalent. The idea of a uni-
versal Turing machine is precisely to have a general-purpose machine to be
able to behave as any specific-purpose Turing machine. Turing showed that
one could encode such a specific-purpose machine as data for the universal
Turing machine. In other words, a Turing universal computer has no prob-
lem with behaving as an electronic calculator without rewiring the universal
computer. This also goes in the other direction. For every specific-purpose
program running on a universal Turing machine, one can build a machine im-
plementing the specific-purpose program. Hence no fundamental distinction
between hardware and software exists.
One immediate reaction, and a possible objection to a behavioural
approach to computation, is the applicability of such a behavioural and
observer-oriented definition to offline computing systems (e.g., batch pro-
cessing systems). This is a legitimate objection, and in Ref. [56] I discuss
this and other objections, which also apply to other behavioural approaches
to other notions, such as the notion of intelligence, and the Turing test. The
immediate answer to the objection is that even a batch process would have to
be programmed at some time, so its “black box” status, “hiding” a comput-
ing process from the observer, is only transitional. This is discussed further
6
and addressed in Ref. [56] and [55] by way of a definition of limit behaviour.
A second immediate reaction is whether placing programmability at the
centre of a definition of computation involves too strong an assumption, as
there are artificial and natural systems that may not look programmable
which one would nevertheless grant are capable of computing (e.g. discrete
neural networks). I think this objection proceeds from a conflation between
the standard meaning of programming and the behavioural one I am ad-
vancing here. While it is true that for many artificial and natural systems
a concept of programmability is difficult to determine, the concept of pro-
grammability advanced in this paper amounts to whether one can, by any
means, make a system behave differently from the way it was already behav-
ing. In this sense, for example, a logic circuit or a batch process may not
qualify as computation if these are unable to react to external stimuli, or if
the observer is unable to witness such an interaction if it happened in the
design or the launch of a computing process, which brings us back to the
previous objection and to the discussion in Ref. [56] and [55].
2 A behavioural approach
Significant effort has been invested in defining computation in denotational,
operational and axiomatic terms. For example, while most approaches prove
that their definitions of a computation and the universe of operations they
are able to compute coincide (leading to the Church-Turing thesis), some
have adopted operational approaches [10] which raise the question of whether
their definitions are simply too broad. An axiomatic approach has also been
developed, with some interesting results [18, 33]. Nevertheless, some authors
have extended the definition of computation to physical objects and physical
processes at different levels of physical reality [49, 12, 17, 51, 11, 40] ranging
from the digital to the quantum. in Ref. [51], for instance, Wolfram states
that “. . . all processes, whether they are produced by human effort or occur
spontaneously in nature, can be viewed as computations”, a definition which
is vulnerable to the criticisms of Searle [32] and Putnam [19].
Klaus Sutner [38] has this to say in regards to Wolfram’s conception of
computation in nature: “This [Wolfram’s] assertion is not particularly con-
troversial, though it does require a somewhat relaxed view of what exactly
constitutes a computation—as opposed to an arbitrary physical process such
as, say, a waterfall.” However, the work of several of the aforementioned
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physicists and computer scientists does indeed allow us to ask whether natu-
ral and physical systems are (or can be viewed as) computational processes.
In fact the claim does not have the same content when advanced by, say,
Wolfram rather than by Lloyd, as the former calls for digital computation
while the latter makes use of quantum computation.
But to make sense of the term “computation” in these contexts, I propose
a behavioural notion of nature-like computation but meaningful in broader
contexts, independent of representation and possible carriers, and classical
in the sense that doesn’t require any other model but the traditional digital
one even if it doesn’t need to commit to any specific model (and that I claim
is the most distinguishable property and advantage of this proposal, that is
model-specific independent). This will require a measure of the degree of
programmability of a system by means of a compressibility index ultimately
rooted in the concept of algorithmic complexity.
The behavioural approach takes this abstraction to the limit (keeping it
physical as opposed to mathematical), with its central question being whether
one can program a system to behave in a desired way. This approach, which
bases itself on the extent to which a system can be programmed, tells us
to what degree a given system resembles a computer. It can serve as an
epistemological framework for interpreting the computational nature of a
system in the broader modern sense of computation, particularly in a physical
context.
As suggested by Sutner [38], it is reasonable to require that any defini-
tion of computation in the general sense, rather than being a purely logical
description (e.g. in terms of recursion theory), should capture some sense of
what a physical computation might be. While Sutner’s suggestion [38] has
similar motivations to ours, it differs from ours in that his aim is to map the
behaviour of a system to the theory of computation, notably computational
degrees. Sutner aligns his approach with his reading of the following claim
made by Searle: [32] “Computational states are not discovered within the
physics, they are assigned to the physics.” Sutner adds “A physical system is
not intrinsically a computer, rather it is necessary to interpret certain features
of the physical system as representing a computation.” This obliges Sutner
to take into consideration the act of interpretation of a physical system as
well as the observer. Sutner’s observer’s language maps the physical object
to an interpretation of what the object does as a computational process.
In Sutner’s view the observer may in the process of interpretation slightly
modify the computation without adding to or carrying out the computation
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attributed to the physical object. One can see Sutner’s model as consisting of
a pair of coupled automata, where one is the physical object and the other the
observer. The observer is defined as an automaton constrained in computa-
tional power, capable of mapping (interpreting)—by way of a transducer—a
physical object onto a computational process using electrical signals. As in
my behavioural approach, the observer plays an important role here, one that
is often overlooked in traditional approaches to the definition of computation
(indeed even ruled out). This is discussed further in Ref. [56]. Our approach
is only concerned with the qualitative character of a computational process
and not its inner workings.
Does the question behind computation concern what enables universality
in a computational setup and how pervasive it is? As Wolfram [51] has long
claimed (and captured in his intuitive Principle of Computational Equiva-
lence), and as Davis has more recently acknowledged [9], it takes very little
to reach universality. In fact it is now clear that it is more difficult to devise
non-trivial systems that are not Turing universal than it is to devise univer-
sal ones. We know, for example, that systems that nobody ever designed
as computers are able to perform universal computation, for example Wol-
fram’s Rule 110 [51, 6], and that these, like other remarkably simple systems,
are capable of complex behaviour and universal computation (e.g. Conway’s
Game of Life or Langton’s ant). These systems may be said to readily arise
physically, as they have not been deliberately designed.
As suggested by Javier Blanco [3], a program can be interestingly de-
fined as that which turns a general-purpose computer into a special-purpose
computer. This is not a strange definition, since in the context of computer
science, a computation (and not even only digital but in general) can be
typically regarded as the evolution undergone by a system when running a
program. However, while interesting in itself, and not without a certain affin-
ity with our approach, this route through the definition of a general-purpose
computer is a circuitous one to take to define computation. For it commits
one to defining computational universality before one can proceed to define
something more basic, which ideally should not depend on such a powerful
(and even more difficult-to-define) concept. Universality is without a doubt
the most important feature of computation, but every time one attempts to
define computation in relation to universal computation, one ends up with
a circular statement [computation is (Turing) universal computation], thus
merely leading to a version of a CT thesis.
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3 Programmability
3.1 Cellular Automata as a case study
A cellular automaton (CA) is a computational model that has proved to be
an interesting object of study, both as a computational device per se and
for modelling all kinds of phenomena [51, 20]. A CA consists of an array of
cells where each takes a value from a finite set of states. Every cell updates
its value depending on the state of its neighbouring cells. Hence the global
behaviour of the automaton depends on the local interaction of its cells. An
Elementary Cellular Automaton (ECA) is a finite automaton defined in a
one-dimensional array. The automaton assumes two states, and updates its
state in discrete time according to its own state and the state of its two
closest neighbours, all cells updating their states synchronously.
As demonstrated by Wolfram [51], the evolution of a system like a cellular
automaton can be viewed as a computation. As shown in Ref. [51] (page 638),
ECA Rule 132 (denoted from now on as R132, R0, R30, etc.) is a simple
cellular automaton whose evolution effectively computes the remainder after
division of a number by 2. Starting from a row of n black cells, 0 black cells
survive if n is even, and 1 black cell survives if n is odd. So in effect this
cellular automaton can be viewed as computing whether a given number is
even or odd. Wolfram provides other CA examples computing functions in
the traditional sense (e.g. R94 as enumerating even numbers; R62 that can
be thought of as enumerating numbers that are multiples of 3; the central
column of the pattern of R129 that can be thought of as enumerating numbers
that are powers of 2; or a CA with 16 states, as capable of computing prime
numbers).
The CA community has developed a strong intuition for determining the
ability of a CA to transmit information and be considered a candidate for
universal computation. Evident properties of rules like the Game of Life [8]
(a 2-dimensional cellular automaton proven to be computationally univer-
sal) and of rules like R110 [51], (a one-dimensional nearest neighbourhood)
simple cellular automata, are structures persisting over time but sensitive
to perturbations. These structures transmit information through a system,
for example, in the form of characteristic gliders and all sorts of other well-
known structures. These structures are unpredictable in a fundamental way
if the system in question is capable of universal computation (as we will learn
below from the work of Go¨del and Turing). Predictable rules, or rules with
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no persistent structures, are often dismissed as incapable of carrying mes-
sages and behaving as universal computers. Nevertheless, CAs computing in
a one-dimensional space, with only 2 states and nearest neighbour, already
have sufficient internal richness, despite this simplicity, to simulate a cyclic
tag system for implementing a universal computing device [6, 51].
Wolfram noticed [51] this richness, and by careful visual inspection of the
evolution of two-dimensional space-time orbits, he was able to classify all the
various behaviours into 4 general classes for CA starting with a random initial
condition. A measure based on the change of the asymptotic direction of the
size of the compressed evolutions of CA (but not limited to CA) for different
initial configurations (following a proposed Gray-code enumeration for one-
dimensional systems) was presented in Ref. [52]. It gauges the resiliency or
sensitivity of a system vis-a`-vis its initial conditions. This measure led to
an interesting characterisation and classification of CA, which when applied
to ECA, yielded exactly Wolfram’s four classes of systems behaviour. The
coefficient works approximating the algorithmic complexity (by compression)
of the different evolutions through time of systems starting from different
initial configurations.
3.2 The metric
On the basis of the principles of algorithmic complexity, one can try to char-
acterise the behaviour of the system [52] as approximated in equation 3. If
the evolution is too random, for example, a compressed version of the evo-
lution of the system won’t be much shorter than the length of the original
evolution itself (one may argue that the complexity of the system is the same,
but this is not true, as the complexity of the closed system includes the input
of the system). As shown in Ref. [52] this characterisation is not only pos-
sible but seems to provide interesting information about the systems (phase
transition detection, rate of information transmission, sensitivity, etc). A
classification based in the phase transition coefficient as defined in Ref. [52]
and here in equation 3, places at the top systems that can be considered
to be both efficient information carriers and highly sensitive (hence related
to a measure of “programmability”), given that they react succinctly to in-
put perturbations. Systems that are too perturbable, however, do not show
phase transitions and are grouped as inefficient information carriers along
with rules displaying only trivial behaviour. The efficiency requirement is to
avoid what is known as Turing tarpits [22], that is, systems that may be ca-
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pable of universal computation but are actually very hard to program. This
means that there is a difference between what can be achieved in principle
and the practical ability of a system to perform a task. This approach is
therefore sensitive to the practicalities of programming a system rather than
to its potential theoretical capability of being programmed.
The first notion to advance is the notion of algorithmic complexity
(Kolmogorov-Chaitin or program-size complexity), defined as follows[21, 4]:
KT (s) = min{|p|, T (p) = s} (1)
That is, the length of the shortest program p that outputs the string s
running on a universal Turing machine T ) [21, 4]. A technical inconvenience
of K as a function taking s to be the length of the shortest program that
produces s, is its non-computability, proven by reduction to the halting prob-
lem. In other words, there is no program which takes a string s as input and
produces the integer K(s) as output. This is usually taken to be a major
problem, but one would expect a universal measure of complexity to have
such a property. The measure was first conceived to define randomness and
is today the accepted objective mathematical measure of complexity, among
other reasons because it has been proven to be mathematically robust (in
that it represents the convergence of several independent definitions). The
mathematical theory of randomness has proven that properties of random ob-
jects can be captured by non-computable measures. One can, for example,
approach K using lossless compression algorithms that detect regularities in
order to compress data. The value of the compressibility method is that
the compression of a string as an approximation to K is a sufficient test of
non-randomness. If the shortest program producing s is larger than |s| the
length of s, then s is considered to be random.
Let C be the approximation to K (given that K is non-computable) by
any means, for example, by using lossless compression algorithms. Let’s
define the function f as the variability of a system M as the result of fitting
a curve φ (by regression analysis) to the data points produced by different
runs of increasing time t′ (for fixed n) up to a given time t, of the sums of
the differences in length of the approximations to Kolmogorov complexity
(C) of a system M for inputs ij , j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, divided by t(n− 1) (for the
sole purpose of normalising the measure by the system’s “volume,” so that
one can roughly compare different systems for different n and different t).
Formally,
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f(M, t, n) = φ
(∑n−1
j=0
|C(Mt(ij))− C(Mt(ij+1))|
t(n− 1)
)
(2)
Where Mt(i) is a system M running for time t and initial input config-
uration i. For one-dimensional input binary systems, a natural numbering
scheme devised in Ref. [52] based on the Gray-code is an example for one-
dimensional systems.
At the limit C captures the behaviour of Mt for t → ∞, but the value
of Ctn depends on the choices of t and n (we may sometimes refer to C as
assuming a certain t and n), so one can only aim to capture some average or
asymptotic behaviour, if any (because no convergence is guaranteed). C is,
however, an indicator of the degree of programmability of a systemM relative
to its external stimuli (input i). The larger the derivative, the greater the
variation in M and hence in the possibility of programming M to perform a
task or transmit information at a rate captured by C itself (that is, whether
for a small set of initial configurationsM produces a single significant change
or does so incrementally).
Now we can use f to define a system’s programmability (first basic defi-
nition) measured by the partial derivative with respect to time:
C
n
t (M) =
∂f(M, t, n)
∂t
(3)
For example, according to this coefficient C, ECA with rule numbers 0
and 30 are close to each other because they remain the same despite the
change of initial conditions (despite the choice of t and n), and they are
hardly perturbable. The measure indicates that rules like rule 0 or rule
30 (denoted from now on as R0, R30, etc.) are incapable of transmitting
information, given that they do not react to changes in the input. In this
sense they are alike because there is no change in the qualitative behaviour
of these CA when fed with different inputs, regardless of how different the
inputs may be—and this is what C measures. R0, for example, remains
entirely blank, while R30 remains mostly random-looking, with no apparent
emergent coherent propagating structures (other than the regular and linear
pattern on one of the sides).
On the other hand, rules such as R122 and R89 have C close to each other
because they are sensitive to initial conditions. As shown in Ref. [52], they
are both highly sensitive to initial conditions and present phase transitions
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which dramatically change their qualitative behaviour when starting from
different initial configurations. This means that rules like R122 and R89 can
be used to transmit information through a system, from the input to the
output.
Values of C for the subclass of CA referred to as ECA (the simplest
one-dimensional closest neighbourhood) were calculated and published in
Ref. [52], and a further investigation of the relation between this transition
coefficient and the computational capabilities of certain known (Turing) uni-
versal machines has been undertaken in Ref. [54]. We will refrain from exact
evaluations of C to avoid distracting the reader with numerical approxima-
tions that may detract from our particular goal in this paper. The aim here
is to propose a behavioural definition of computation based on this measure
rather than to evaluate specific values that have already been calculated in
Ref. [54].
This transition coefficient will be used to dynamically define computation
based on the degree of programmability of a system. The advantage of using
the transition coefficient C is that it is indifferent to the internal states,
formalism or architecture of a computer or computing model; it doesn’t even
specify whether a machine has to be quantum, digital or analogue, or what its
maximal computational power should be. It is only based on the behaviour
of the system in question. It allows us to minimally characterise the concept
of computation on the basis of behaviour alone. And in doing so, it allows
us to gauge the efficiency of the reaction to external stimuli and the transfer
of information by noting the rate at which C changes. in Ref. [56] we discuss
this “efficiency” property of C in more detail.
Let’s denote as a C-computer a system with programmability coefficient
C capturing the capability of the system to transfer information from its
input towards its output. Under this notation, ECA R255 (Fig. 1) is a
0-computer, that is, a computer unable to carry out any operation because
it cannot transfer any information from the input to the output (another
way to say this is that R255 does not compute), others may compute even if
it can be proven to only compute a small subset of the Turing computable
functions (see e.g. 2). ECA R255 cannot by any means be programmed
to perform any task, despite the input. This allows us to answer (in
the negative) Chalmers’ challenging question [5] prompted by Putnam’s
objection: “Does a Rock Implement Every Finite-State Automaton?”. It
clearly doesn’t under this definition and is in clear contradiction with claims
that “objects compute themselves” [41] (an objection having to do with
14
Figure 1: ECA R255 (equivalent by colour inversion to R0; R255 is used here
for visual convenience) is stuck, unable to perform any computation—it does
not react to any external stimulus. This is an illustration of a C-computer
for C close (or equal) to zero [52]. The picture shows a series of evolutions
for 12 random inputs, with the cellular automaton rule depicted at the top.
scale will be addressed later). The sense of what is required if something is
not to be a computer can be captured with the following definition:
Definition 1. A 0-computer is not a computer in any intuitive sense
because it is not capable of carrying out any calculation.
It may be misleading to call a system that does not compute a 0-computer,
but it is crucial to this approach to convey the way in which a system is ruled
not to be a computer, viz. because its coefficient C = 0, the main point of
this paper being to distinguish what computation is from what it is not, by
means of this alternative “behavioural” definition.
A system capable of (Turing) universal computation (see Fig. 3) would
therefore have a non-zero C limit value. C also captures some of the universal
computational efficiency of the computer in that it has the advantage of cap-
turing not only whether it is capable of reacting to the input and transferring
information through its evolution, but also the rate at which it does so. So C
is an index of both capability in principle and ability in practice. A non-zero
C means that there is a way to codify a program to make the system behave
(efficiently) in one fashion or another, i.e. to be programmable. Something
that is not programmable cannot therefore be taken to be a computer.
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Figure 2: ECA R4 is a kind of program filter that only transfers bits in
isolation (i.e. when its neighbours are both white). It is clear that one can
perform some very simple computations with this automaton. However, one
could not, for example, implement a typical logic gate based on its particular
behaviour. It clearly cannot carry out (Turing) universal computation.
Figure 3: ECA R110 is efficient at carrying information through persistent
local structures to the output, reacting to external stimuli. Its Ctn value
for sensible choices of t and n [52] is compatible with the fact that it has
been proven that R110 is capable of universal computation for a particular
semi-periodic initial configuration [51, 6].
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One can also see that things that seemed to behave like computers
but were not called computers can indeed be considered computers under
this approach. Mathematical functions, for example, can be considered C-
computers for some C determined by the domain of the function. That
a function can be considered a computer does not controvert the theory
wherein a computer is defined in terms of a function and a domain, and a
function in terms of an algorithm having the input as its arguments and the
output as its function evaluation. The calculation of a function, however,
seems to require a carrier. Usually that carrier is a piece of paper and a
pencil wielded by a human being, but it can also be a physical computer.
Can the simple description of the function be considered a computer or a
C-computer? I think it should not be. Something static shouldn’t be consid-
ered to have a behaviour, and I think this can be captured by C. To evaluate
C one needs to actually run a program, otherwise it remains unevaluated
(whether it is visible to the observer is the legitimate objection we already
mentioned in Section 1, and further discussed in Ref. [56]). Can we not (in
principle) think of computations that don’t calculate functions? Yes, and
this is what this behavioural approach to computation is about. There is no
need of representation or even definition of the objects of computation; it is
how a system seems to behave which leads us to attribute to it some degree
of computation.
This makes for a clear distinction between, for example, a vision of the
universe as a mathematical structure and a vision of the universe as a com-
puter. While the latter may account for the physical carrier, implying that
the computation is being carried out by the universe itself, it does not seem
clear how a mathematical structure can come equipped with the carrier on
which it should be executed, unless it becomes a computer program and
therefore a computer.
Another example using a 2-dimensional cellular automaton is given in
Ref. [57], showing that Conway’s Game of Life (GoL) indeed has a large
enough C value, which is in agreement with the idea that C captures the
programmability of a system (knowing as we do that GoL is capable of Turing
universal computation).
3.3 Reversibility, 0-computers and conservation laws
in Ref. [42], Margolus asserts that reversible cellular automata can actually
be used as computer models embodying discrete analogues of classical no-
17
tions in physics, such as space, time, locality and microscopic reversibility.
He suggests that one way to show that a given rule can exhibit complicated
behaviour (and eventually universality) is to show (as has been done with
the Game of Life [8] and R110 [6, 51]) that “in the corresponding ‘world’ it
is possible to have computers” starting these automata with the appropriate
initial states, with digits acting as signals moving about and interacting with
each other to, for example, implement a logical gate for digital computation.
Wolfram reinforces this vision by suggesting, through his Principle of Com-
putational Equivalence, that it is indeed the case that non-trivial behaviours
inevitably lead to universal computation.
This does not mean that a system must necessarily be bijective (hence
reversible) in its input/output mapping in order to be universal. But it is
actually reversible CA with high entropy (number of possible states) which
will tend to show the greatest behavioural richness and therefore be consid-
ered the best candidates for being classified as computers. In other words,
the greater the richness a system is capable of, the greater the C coefficient
it will have. A reversible CA (RCA) has the property that starting it from
a random state is like starting from a maximum entropy state in a ther-
modynamical system, because the RCA is not allowed to get simpler in its
evolution, the only way to get simpler being to collapse the number of states,
making it irreversible. Entropy in a randomly initiated RCA can only in-
crease, but if it reaches maximum entropy it can’t get any more complicated,
and so nothing much happens. This is also captured by C, in that the RCA
always look the same and are immune to evolutionary changes, presenting
homogeneous local entropy everywhere.
RCA are interesting because they allow information to propagate, and in
some sense they can be thought of as perfect computers, indeed in exactly
the sense that matters to us. If one starts an RCA from a non-uniformly
random initial state, the RCA evolves, but because it cannot get simpler
than its initial condition (for the same reason given for the random state)
it can only get more complicated, producing a computational history that
is reversible and can only lead to an increase in entropy. The RCA, how-
ever, is only reshaping the message that it got at the beginning in the form
of an initial configuration, and so the amount of information in the RCA
evolution remains the same. Which makes it a perfect example of a system
with increasing entropy but consistent complexity over time. The algorithmic
complexity of the RCA is the same because one can track the RCA back to
the original information content represented by its initial configuration. So
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the state of the CA at any time always carries the same information content.
In non-reversible CA, however, information can be lost, and even though
the algorithmic complexity of the evolution of a CA is always the same, one
cannot recover it a posteriori from any later state. In reversible CA, entropy,
like information content, may increase or decrease over time. As Margolus
himself states, it is one thing to know that a gas was in one corner at a
given state, and another to return the gas from its expanded condition to its
original position. It may thus seem that RCA in Wolfram’s class III may all
be chaotic, but Wolfram [50] offers examples of one-dimensional reversible
cellular automata exhibiting three types of behaviour of local structures as
they propagate in space.
In nature-like computation, conservation laws are important because the
physical carrier on which a computation will be performed is governed by
physical conservation laws (laws that conserve physical invariants such as
mass, energy, momentum, etc.). In RCA, there are cases where the simplest
locally-computable invariants are cells whose values never change, and which
are analogous to nature-like conservation laws. That is, laws such that for
any given property, the physical state of the system does not change as the
system evolves. The simplest RCA capable of doing this are those that ig-
nore their neighbouring cells and only look to the central one, reproducing
it identically. One may have doubts about calling these computers because
there is no transformation of information whatsoever, with the system just
letting pass through it anything that it is fed. Even worse, there are systems
that may look as if they are computing the identity function while in fact
performing a series of intermediate transformations which lead to the same
output a few steps later (again prompting the objection that their perfor-
mance is relative to the observer). From the behavioural perspective based
on the transition coefficient, under the qualitative definition the two would
be behaving differently if they delivered their richness at different rates, even
if they produced the same output. This discussion helps us to see how close
these computational systems are to physical phenomena and to purely be-
havioural descriptions, but also to address some potential concerns raised by
the qualitative approach proposed herein. If things could be worse for infor-
mation processing, given that classical mechanics prescribes determinism in
the macroscopic universe, one can extend these worries to the entire world,
but this is a subject for a different, though related, discussion.
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4 Behavioural equivalence
We can then define a system performing computation simply based on its
behaviour, as follows:
Definition 2. A system U computes if Ctn(U) > 0 for some t, n > 0
Meaning that U can be programmed. Whether U can compute only a
subset of computable functions or all of them will depend not only on C but
also on the details of U that escape the behavioural definition. Yet it is clear
that if U is Turing universal, Ctn(U) > 0. This definition accords with a much
broader sense of nature and physics-like computation as used in, for example,
modern models of physics (to mention but a few examples [17, 49, 51, 11, 40])
and natural computation. One can see that there are systems that are not
computers under this definition—simple ones are R0 and R255 ECA (see Fig.
1). As we know, the equivalence of computations is ultimately undecidable.
Even in practice it can only be approached and partially answered, given that
the transition coefficient on which the qualitative definition of computation is
based is limited by finite resources (reflected by the finite values of t and n),
providing only an approximate indication of the behavioural programmability
of a system, and for t possibly an asymptotic behaviour (no convergence is
guaranteed though).
If two systems have about the same Ctn for fixed n and t however, it means
that they react to changes at about the same rate, so it may not only capture
the property of transferring information but if information is transferred, it
captures the rate at which it does so. Hence by varying n and t, one can
also possibly soundly define rates of convergence of C. Some of this is also
discussed in Ref. [56].
Clearly, under this definition behaviour space is less dense than algorithm
and program space, because there may be different programs implementing
different algorithms but generating the same behaviour. So one can only
define two behaviourally equivalent systems as follows:
Definition 3. A system U and U ′ are computationally equivalent in
behavioural terms if Cnt (U) = C
n
t (U
′) for any t and n.
Simple examples of a behavioural computational class are C-computers
for C = 0, i.e. they cannot be programmed, and are behaviourally equiva-
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lent. Under Def. 1 and 2, systems that are identified as 0-computers do not
compute, as they are not capable of being programmed.
Experience tells us that something that behaves in a certain way will
continue doing so, and we have empirically established as much in Ref. [53].
This can be justified by algorithmic probability, because the longer we
observe a computing system, the smaller the chance that its behaviour
will change radically. So even though one cannot guarantee a behaviour
ad infinitum, algorithmic probability may provide the stability required to
make reliable generalisations. Thus one can arrive at a weak Def. 4 by
allowing C(U) to be close enough to C(U ′) as follows:
Definition 4. A system U and U ′ are c-computationally equivalent if
|C(U)− C(U ′)| < c.
It is worth stressing that two systems (or computers) are not the same
in any other sense if they have the same coefficient C. C is a measure of
sensitivity (which I understand as the amenability of a system to being pro-
grammed); it cannot on its own indicate whether two computers compute
the same function, and is therefore a different measure than those available
from traditional computability and formal semantics. It can tell when two
computers diverge in their behaviour, because for two computers to be the
same, a necessary but not sufficient condition is that they must both have the
same transition coefficient (or differ by a desired C), which would mean that
they have the same capability of reacting to external stimuli, and transmit
information at about the same rate. Because C itself depends on two param-
eters (n and t), this also means that C can only make comparisons between
two systems for fixed t and n (the same runtime and the same number of
input configurations). So two C-computers are behaviourally equivalent if
they have the same C.
For the same reason that one cannot tell whether a machine will halt for
a given input, one cannot decide whether two computers compute the same
function, but one can relate nature-like computation and abstract compu-
tation by means of Turing machines as follows: for every C-computer U ,
there exists a program P behaviourally equivalent to U , that is, with tran-
sition coefficient C(U) = C(P ) independent of n and t, because there exists
a universal Turing machine T capable of reproducing the exact behaviour of
U .
It is also worth noting that this behavioural definition is cumulative (but
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not additive), in the sense that a C-computer can be embedded in the work-
ings of another C′-computer for C 6= C′ (such as in the server room example).
If the C′-computer does not impose any behavioural restriction on the C-
computer, then clearly C′ ≥ C, given that the new computer will be capable
of at least C-computation. This is the sense in which one may see R255 as a
program in the context of a C-computer with C 6= 0 capable of running R255.
If the C-computer is, for example, a universal computer, R255 would be a
program but cannot by itself be a computer. The C-computers behaviourally
equivalent to R255 would then be all those for which C = 0.
5 What kind of C-computer might the uni-
verse be?
The question of whether a server room containing many racks of servers is in
itself a computer in any interesting sense seems to depend on the observer’s
role. If one wished to apply C to a server room, it would be legitimate to do
so and to consider the room as the set of the C-computers that it contains.
Whether doing so is useful or not is another question, but I think that it is
not only useful but that it is also common to consider server rooms as assets
that can be commercialised as computers by themselves (computing black
boxes for the final users) without getting into the details of the contents of
the room and selling its added computing power (this is not very different to
farm computing or even current approaches to computation such as multicore
systems).
Unconventional computers may also be considered C-computers. When
one turns on a lamp the lamp is programmed to do something, in this case
to turn on. Even if trivial, it reacts to the input by producing light as
the outcome. One can see how the programmability notion here is slightly
different to the traditional concept because a lamp is a specific-purpose device
which cannot be reprogrammed from the traditional point of view, but from
this point of view the input changes the behaviour of the system and hence
has a programmability degree, even if very limited. But even if the lamp can
be considered to react to external stimuli the space of its initial configurations
is finite and small (only two possible initial configurations), hence the slope
of the differences of the behavioural evolution in time and therefore its Cnt
is very close to 0 for any n and t. If one wants to rule out lamps or fridges
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as computing devices one would only need to define a threshold for which
beyond that threshold a system can be said to compute, while under the
threshold it would be discarded. A fridge can be seen as cooling objects that
are introduced into it, the output being the cooling—after an interval—of
the objects in question. That both a lamp and a fridge can be viewed as
C-computers with small C, given that they have limited programmability
(to perform a single, specific task), should not be surprising, at least not in
light of the definition of a C-computer, nor should it deprive the notion of
computation of meaning, as it has been the purpose of this paper to offer
a grading system for computation precisely in order to provide meaning to
such claims, with the advantage that one can now ask whether a lamp or
a fridge is or isn’t a computer without trivialising either the question or
the answer. Under the behavioural definition advanced herein, they are very
limited computing systems only if one wants to keep a threshold of computing
very low, as long as it is stated that they are limited in scope by the objective
value of C.
One can think of the laws of physics, for example of gravitation, as car-
rying out some sort of computation, with the degree of programmability (we
are not discussing here whether the model for the physical law corresponds
to the real-world, which is a different matter) of such a system limited to
performing a particular task, in the case of gravitation pulling objects to-
ward each other and keeping them in their gravitational trajectory. Classical
mechanics guarantees that the system is deterministic, even if that doesn’t
mean one can predict its workings given any specific parameters (e.g. 3 bod-
ies). There is no fundamental reason, however, for following the approach
described herein when assessing whether a system can compute based on
its degree of programmability. Still, the fact that one can coarse grain what
computation may mean by way of the parameter C, and guarantee that there
are both systems with maximal C, and C = 0 for systems that can be pro-
grammed to do something, and others that cannot be programmed at all
and show no reaction to any external stimulus (e.g. see Fig. 1), imbues this
approach and its definition of computers and computation with sense, par-
ticularly in the context of nature-like computation as proposed by some of
the aforementioned authors. There are also C-computers for small values of
C, meaning that the system can hardly be programmed because it does not
transfer information efficiently enough (this may be the case, for example,
with R30, see Fig. 4).
This is also related to the recurrent question of whether the universe can
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Figure 4: Despite the simplicity of the description of ECA R30 the behaviour
of R30 is always random-looking (albeit the leftmost evolution which shows
some regularities) even for simple and structured initial conditions. The
overall qualitative behaviour of R30 remains unchanged disregarding the ini-
tial condition. An open question is whether this rule is “too hot” to be
programmed and used to compute (see [26]).
be said to compute. In some sense it does, for we know there are C-computers
in it capable of universal computation, but we don’t really know whether the
universe (e.g. as represented by its physical laws) constrains C, a limit broad
enough to encompass every possible C-computer for a maximal C contained
in the physical universe. The universe as a whole can be seen and treated in
this context as a computer, as it is a C-computer for maximal C, given that
it contains all possible C-computers. There is, however, a legitimate strong
objection to this view which is discussed in Ref. [56], given that it is difficult
to apply the behavioural measure to a system for which “external stimuli” is
not well defined, vis-a`-vis the universe, without falling into a contradiction,
because any “external stimuli” is part of the universe. Even if the objection
holds, we are not particularly interested in addressing the question of whether
the universe is a computer. However, it may be only noted that this objection
is again related to the question of the role of the observer and its place.
5.1 The question of scale
So far, the object of this behavioural approach to computation has been
to provide a reasonable framework for assertions connecting the notion of
24
computation to nature, and how nature may or may not compute, in light of
current uses of the term ‘compute’. Lloyd [40], for example, claims that since
the universe is computing itself, things in the universe would therefore also
be computing themselves. Think of the example of a still physical object (e.g.
a desk or a sheet of paper). These objects would hardly compute anything at
their macroscopic level, say an addition between any 2 numbers, yet they may
be constituted at a molecular or atomic scale of particles capable of carrying
out all sorts of computations, which unlike the objects, may be programmed,
either as part of another system or in themselves. It is clear then that the
span of behaviour at that scale is greater than at the scale of the object itself.
But does it make sense to say that something computes itself? [40]. It may
or it may not.
In the real world, things are constituted by smaller elements unless they
are elementary particles. One therefore has to study the behaviour of a
system at a given scale and not at all possible scales, otherwise the question
becomes meaningless, as elements of a physical object are molecules, and
ultimately atoms and particles that have their own behaviour, about which
too the question about computation can be asked. This means that a C-
computer may have a low or null C at some scale but contain C′-computers
with C′ > C at another scale (for which the original object is no longer
the same as a whole). A setup in which C′ ≤ C is actually common at
some scale for any computational device. For example, a digital computer is
made of simpler components, each of which at some macroscopic level but
independently of the interconnected computer is of lower behavioural richness
and may qualify for a C of lower value. In other words, the behavioural
definition is not additive in the sense that a C-computer can contain or be
contained in another C′-computer such that C 6= C′.
Can R255, for example, be thought of as computing itself as it evolves?
Under the qualitative definition, even if R255 is computing itself it cannot
be programmed, and so is a 0-computer under our approach, a computer not
capable of computation and therefore hardly a computer at all. On the other
hand, R255 does not present any problem of scale as it represents itself at
all scales. A table, however, is made of smaller components to which may
be assigned some specific task, and one may even consider reprogramming
the matter of which it is made, in the manner epitomised in the subfield of
programmable matter. In which case one may say that the table is com-
puting itself, since it could be computing something else out of its atoms.
So the definition of a C-computer is scale-dependent and its implementation
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in the real world is subtle, yet at the abstract level it seems to correspond
to an interesting and well-delineated definition of computation based on its
behavioural capabilities.
One can see there are some strong parallelisms between this account and
the concern of scale with what Floridi has names Levels of Abstraction [16]
in that an information agent (the observer) accesses a physical or conceptual
environment, the system, to determine whether it does compute or not. As
with Levels of Abstraction, behavioural computational degrees as defined
herein are not necessarily hierarchical but they are comparable and they may
act as interfaces mediating between the epistemic relation of the observer and
the observed.
In the physical world, under this qualitative approach, things may com-
pute or not depending on the scale (or Level of Abstraction) at which they
are studied. To say that a table computes only makes sense at the scale of
the table, and as a C-computer it should have a very limited C, that is, a very
limited behaviour given that it can hardly be programmed to do something
else. Other possible objections are addressed in Ref. [56].
6 Concluding remarks
I have proposed a novel qualitative notion of computation based on the
sensitivity of a system to external stimuli connected to a concept of pro-
grammability, a notion I have called nature-like computation, that provides a
behavioural interpretation of computation (and of computers). This is con-
sonant with current lines of technology for programming molecules and cells
to compute. See for example Ref. [1]. In some sense this can be seen as
reprogramming a cell to do certain tasks that it wasn’t supposed to be able
to do in the natural course of things. In a way this is what we have done with
digital computers too, building machines out of natural matter to make them
do calculations for us. Everything revolves around a single concept, that of
programmability, which I have suggested can be captured by a measure of
behaviour rather than by syntactic or even semantic approaches, given that
the former requires descriptions of inner workings, even though we may not
even fully understand the machinery of a cell, while the latter requires an in-
terpretation of computation. The behavioural approach, however, is agnostic
on most of these counts, being concerned only with the qualitative behaviour
of a system, with its ability to transfer information upon being stimulated.
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The concept also helps to make sense of current uses of computation in the
context of natural phenomena.
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